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INTRODUCTION
1

Religious liberty is a bedrock principle of our national heritage.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Founders saw the separation of church and state as necessary to guarantee individuals the
freedom to openly practice the religion of their choosing without fear
2
of governmental persecution. James Madison, for example, was a
3
strong supporter of the federal protection of religious freedom. The
1

The Supreme Court has explained that

[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.
We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as
wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
2
See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947) (“A large proportion of
the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws
which compelled them to support and attend government-favored churches.”).
3
During the debates over the Constitution in the Virginia Ratifying Convention,
Madison opined that religious freedom was better guarded by the Federal Congress
than by the legislature of any one state.
There is not a shadow of right in the General Government to intermeddle
with religion.—Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation.—I can appeal to my uniform conduct on this subject, that I have warmly
supported religious freedom.—It is better that this security should be depended upon from the General Legislature, than from one particular State.
Patrick Henry & James Madison, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention ( June
12, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 673, 690 (Bernard Bailyn
ed., 1993).
In fact, Madison would have preferred broader protection than was politically palatable at the time. Madison’s initial draft of the Federal Bill of Rights sought to protect “full and equal rights of conscience,” not simply free exercise of religion, from infringement “in any manner, or on any pretext.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 ( Joseph
Gales ed., 1834) (emphasis added). But cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Ass’n ( Jan. 1, 1802) (“Believing with you that religion is a matter which
lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith
or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not
opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of
separation between church and State.”), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 510, 510
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Bill of Rights thus enshrines religious liberty as a fundamental right
4
and places it prominently at the beginning of the First Amendment.
Over time, however, the protections guaranteed by the First
Amendment have been qualified by judicial decisionmaking. In 1990,
the Supreme Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that a neutral,
generally applicable law is entitled to deferential rational basis review,
5
even if the law prohibits conduct central to an individual’s religion.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Smith dramatically limited prior Supreme Court precedent that had required strict scrutiny of any law
6
substantially infringing upon the right to free exercise of religion.
The widespread perception that principles of stare decisis had been
violated by the Smith Court provoked a powerful congressional response. At least two bills signed into law sought to restore the reli7
gious freedom thought to have been lost after Smith.
The latest congressional attempt to restore the religious liberty
promised by the Constitution is the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).8 RLUIPA contains an Equal
Terms provision, which states that “[n]o government shall impose or
implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious
assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious
9
assembly or institution.” As this Comment will show, however, some
federal courts have interpreted RLUIPA in such a way as to render it
toothless.

(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). The fact that Madison’s preferred language was not
adopted further indicates that the Free Exercise Clause was specifically meant to protect religion as opposed to philosophy or other nonreligious belief systems. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1491 (1990) (arguing that the choice of the term “free exercise of religion” “singles out religion for special treatment”).
4
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
5
See 494 U.S. 872, 885-87 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as recognized in Cutter
v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.3.2.3, at 1259 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining that, post-Smith, rational basis review applies to neutral and generally applicable laws that burden religion).
6
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (requiring a compelling state
interest in order to justify substantial infringement of the First Amendment right to
free exercise of religion).
7
One of these bills, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000, is the focus of this Comment. The second is the Act’s ill-fated predecessor, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, discussed infra Section I.C.
8
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006).
9
Id. § 2000cc(b)(1).
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The federal circuit courts are split as to the proper interpretation
of the Equal Terms provision. The Eleventh Circuit noted in Midrash
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside that while the provision “has the ‘feel’
of an equal protection law, it lacks the ‘similarly situated’ requirement
10
usually found in equal protection analysis.” Therefore, a land-use
regulation violates RLUIPA if a secular assembly or institution, in the
ordinary sense of those terms, can locate where a religious assembly or
11
The Seventh Circuit agreed, stating in Vision
institution cannot.
Church v. Village of Long Grove that “a plaintiff need not demonstrate
disparate treatment between two institutions similarly situated in all re12
levant respects.” The Third Circuit disagreed with both the Seventh
and Eleventh Circuits, holding in Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc.
v. City of Long Branch that “a regulation will violate the Equal Terms
provision only if it treats religious assemblies or institutions less well
than secular assemblies or institutions that are similarly situated as to
13
the regulatory purpose.”
The Third Circuit also disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit regarding the standard of review that should apply to a regulation upon a
14
finding of unequal treatment. While the Eleventh Circuit held that
the challenged regulation should receive strict scrutiny upon a finding
15
of unequal treatment, the Third Circuit held that the government
should be held strictly liable for a violation of the Equal Terms provision. Thus, under the Third Circuit’s test, the challenged regulation
16
is automatically invalidated upon a finding of unequal treatment.
The Third Circuit’s interpretation of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms
provision responds to a valid concern that the provision should not
10

366 F.3d 1214, 1229 (11th Cir. 2004).
See id. at 1230-31 (construing the terms “assembly” and “institution” “in accordance with their ordinary or natural meanings” and concluding that because “private
clubs, churches and synagogues fall under the umbrella of ‘assembly or institution[,]’
. . . differential treatment constitutes a violation of § (b)(1) of RLUIPA”).
12
468 F.3d 975, 1003 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
13
510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 2007).
14
The Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed these standard of review issues. See
Sarah Keeton Campbell, Note, Restoring RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 58 DUKE L.J.
1071, 1074 & n.14 (2009) (“The Seventh Circuit has addressed the first issue, but not
the second.”).
15
See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1232 (“[A] violation of § (b)’s equal treatment provision, consistent with the analysis employed in [Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)], must undergo strict scrutiny.”).
16
See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269 (“[I]f a land-use regulation treats religious assemblies or institutions on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies or institutions that are no less harmful to the governmental objectives in enacting the regulation, that regulation—without more—fails under RLUIPA.”).
11
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be interpreted to grant religious entities greater rights than secular
entities. In light of the text and legislative history of RLUIPA, however, the imposition of a “similarly situated” requirement and a
strict-liability standard of review ignores the plain language of the
statute as well as Congress’s express purpose in enacting it. The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation in Midrash is more consistent with the
text of the statute, Congress’s express findings of religious discrimination, and RLUIPA’s purpose.
In her insightful Note, recently published in the Duke Law Journal, Sarah Keeton Campbell argues that a strict textual interpretation
of the Equal Terms provision would be within Congress’s powers un17
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. While Campbell contends that imposing a similarly situated requirement on the Equal
Terms provision is inappropriate, she does not believe that the appropriate standard of review is strict scrutiny of the challenged regulation
18
upon a finding of unequal treatment. This Comment, in contrast,
argues that the strict-liability standard of review advocated by Campbell might exceed the boundaries set by the Supreme Court’s holding
19
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. The text of
RLUIPA expressly provides that the Act should be construed to protect religious exercise to the broadest extent constitutionally permissi20
ble, which, under Lukumi, means strict scrutiny of the challenged
regulation.
In Part I of this Comment, I review the history of federal protection of religious exercise from the ratification of the Constitution to
the enactment of RLUIPA. In Part II, I summarize the judicial interpretations of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision. Finally, in Part III, I
argue that the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation in Midrash is preferable because it recognizes legislative supremacy and effectuates the will
of the American people as expressed in the text of the statute enacted
by their elected representatives.

17

Campbell, supra note 14, at 1075-76. Section 5 empowers Congress “to enforce,
by apropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
18
See Campbell, supra note 14, at 1104.
19
See 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“A law burdening religious practice that is not
neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To
satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice
must advance interests of the highest order and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of
those interests.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
20
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2006).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
Our nation has enjoyed a long and distinguished history of
upholding every American’s right to freely profess and practice the
religious beliefs of her choice. This Part provides a brief overview of
the federal protection of religious exercise.
A. The Constitution
The Constitution is the starting point for any analysis of religiousliberty rights. The First Amendment provides two forms of protection
21
for religion: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
This Comment is primarily concerned with the protections conferred by
the Free Exercise Clause, which prevents the states and the federal gov22
ernment from passing any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.
The Bill of Rights was enacted as a result of popular concern that
the federal government would not be accountable to the people in
the absence of express restrictions on the exercise of governmental
23
authority. The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment were largely
designed to assuage fears that the federal government might attempt
24
to establish religion or prohibit religious exercise in the states, as
well as to guarantee that the religious preferences of one state would
not be imposed on the country as a whole. The Founders’ use of the
term “free exercise” implies that the Clause was meant to protect not
25
only religious belief but also religious conduct. Indeed, the Supreme
Court itself has stated that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause . . . withdraws
from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on
21

See supra note 4.
Id.; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the
Free Exercise Clause against the states).
23
See, e.g., Kenneth R. Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale”: The Founding Fathers and
Adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223, 251 (1988) (“The constitutional role as well as the consecrated status of the federal Bill of Rights today is due less
to the foresight of the Founding Fathers than to the vigilance of a concerned citizenry . . . .”); Samuel Bryan, “Centinel” I, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Oct. 5, 1787 (arguing that a federal government without a Bill of Rights similar to that found in most
free Constitutions “would be in practice a permanent aristocracy” (emphasis omitted)), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 52, 61.
24
See McConnell, supra note 3, at 1477-79 (examining the shortcomings of the Federalist argument against a Bill of Rights, including that powers such as those enumerated in the Necessary and Proper Clause have the potential to be used oppressively).
25
Id. at 1488. McConnell goes on to note that the Supreme Court puzzlingly rejected this reading of the term “free exercise” in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164 (1879), and did not acknowledge the protection of religiously motivated conduct
afforded by the Free Exercise Clause until 1940. Id. at 1488-89.
22
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the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in
26
the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority.”
The next constitutional provision relevant to recent congressional
attempts to protect religious liberty is the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
27
due process of law.”
“Liberty” includes the religious liberty con28
Section 5 of the Fourteenth
ferred by the First Amendment.
Amendment further provides that “Congress shall have power to en29
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” Thus,
when Congress has found the states to be remiss in their duty, Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment enables Congress to use its remedial
power to enact laws enforcing the guarantees of religious liberty
found in the First Amendment. RLUIPA is one such law.
B. Case Law Interpreting the Free Exercise Clause
The first case to interpret the Free Exercise Clause came down in
30
1879. In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a Mormon who had contracted plural marriages could not obtain a religious
31
exemption from the federal antipolygamy statute. The Court, deciding not to protect religiously motivated conduct in the face of a general32
ly applicable criminal law, thus interpreted the Free Exercise Clause
countertextually. This interpretation remained unchanged until the
1940 case of Cantwell v. Connecticut, in which the Court upheld the right

26
27
28

Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that

[t]he fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws.
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
29
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
30
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 12.3.1, at 1246.
31
See 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879) (explaining that a religious exemption for Mormons would subordinate the law to religious belief).
32
See id. at 166 (“Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”).
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of Jehovah’s Witnesses to proselytize without prior governmental re33
straint, even in ways considered aggressive and offensive to Catholics.
In the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner, the Court adopted a more
expansive reading of the Free Exercise Clause, one that embraced not
only protection for religiously motivated conduct but also religious
34
exemption from generally applicable laws. Sherbert involved a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church who was discharged by her
employer because she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath for
35
Seventh-day Adventists. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act required that a claimant be able to work and be availa36
ble for work in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits. The
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to the South Carolina law, requiring a compelling state interest in order to justify substantial in37
fringement of the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.
The compelling state interest asserted by South Carolina was the unproven possibility of “unscrupulous” workers filing fraudulent claims
for unemployment compensation using the pretext of religious obser38
vance. The Court held that South Carolina could not constitutionally deny one of its citizens unemployment compensation simply because she refused to compromise her religious beliefs in order to
39
come within the statute’s prescription. The statute thus failed strict
scrutiny. This was the law of the land until 1988.
In 1988, the Supreme Court decided Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n.40 The case posed the question whether the Free
Exercise Clause prohibited the government from building a road
through part of a national forest traditionally used by Native Ameri41
cans for religious purposes. The Native Americans argued that the
road construction could not be upheld without a compelling state interest because it would impose a substantial burden on their religious
42
exercise. The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that the government’s decision did not “penalize religious activity by denying any
33

See 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (“[A] state may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.”).
34
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
35
Id. at 399.
36
Id. at 400.
37
Id. at 406.
38
Id. at 407.
39
Id. at 410.
40
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
41
Id. at 441-42.
42
Id. at 447.
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person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by
43
other citizens.” The Court further reasoned that the government
had a right to decide what to do with its land and that, while accommodation of religious practices was to be encouraged, the Constitution “does not . . . offer to reconcile [religious organizations’] various
44
competing demands on government.”
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Em45
ployment Division v. Smith.
Smith effectively overturned Sherbert by
holding that the compelling interest test would no longer apply to a
neutral, generally applicable law, even if the law prohibits conduct
46
central to an individual’s religion. Smith involved two Native Americans who were fired from their jobs and then denied unemployment
compensation because they had ingested peyote, a controlled substance under federal and Oregon state law, “for sacramental purposes
47
at a ceremony of the Native American Church.” The Court held that
rational basis review applied to the state unemployment-compensation
statute and that Oregon could constitutionally deny the ex-employees
unemployment benefits because the criminal drug laws were neutral
48
and generally applicable. The Court retained the compelling interest test, however, for situations where the government has a system of
49
individualized exemptions in place.
Just such a system of individualized exemptions was presented to
50
the Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. In
that case, members of the Santeria religion, which practices ritual animal sacrifice, were found to have been discriminated against by facial51
ly neutral city ordinances prohibiting all ritual animal sacrifice. The
ordinances were riddled with exceptions for animals raised for food
purposes (including an exception for kosher slaughter), clearly evincing that the state’s interests in protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals were being pursued only against Santeria
52
There was also evidence that the ordinances were
practitioners.
43

Id. at 449.
Id. at 452, 454.
45
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
46
Id. at 883-85.
47
Id. at 874.
48
Id. at 890.
49
Id. at 884.
50
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
51
Id. at 525-29, 532.
52
See id. at 543 (“[The ordinances] fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does.”).
44
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enacted in response to the Santeria church’s announcement of its
53
plans to open in Hialeah. The Court found that the ordinances were
54
neither neutral nor generally applicable. The Court then held that
“[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application . . . must advance interests of the highest order and
55
must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.” In other
words, where a law that burdens religion is either not neutral or not
generally applicable, the compelling interest test still controls.
Despite the exception for a system of individualized exemptions,
Smith did away with the compelling interest test for neutral, generally
applicable laws. Some, like Marci Hamilton in her book God vs. the
56
Gavel, have argued that Smith was not a departure from settled
precedent at all. Hamilton writes that Smith “cast the preceding cases
that had seemed to rest on a principle at odds with the dominant approach[] in a different light to show that they were not inconsistent
57
with the long-established principles the Court was reaffirming.” On
the other hand, the Court may simply have been searching for a way
out of creating religious exemptions to generally applicable criminal
laws. Regardless, many argued after Smith that “the Court had overturned a long-settled doctrine that required strict scrutiny of any law,
no matter how neutral, that substantially burdened religious con58
duct.” Congress, as it turned out, agreed with this latter point of view.
C. RFRA and City of Boerne v. Flores
In the wake of Smith, Congress responded by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).59 Finding that Smith
had “virtually eliminated” the compelling interest test previously appli60
cable to burdens on religious exercise imposed by neutral laws, Congress reinstated that test, mandating that even rules of general applicability could only substantially burden religious exercise if they were
53

Id. at 540-41 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
See id. at 542, 545-46 (majority opinion) (holding that the ordinances were not
neutral because their object was to suppress religion and that they were not generally
applicable because the government’s interests were pursued only against religiously
motivated conduct).
55
Id. at 546 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56
MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005).
57
Id. at 221. But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 12.3.2.3, at 1258 (“In Employment
Division v. Smith, the Court expressly changed the law of the free exercise clause.”).
58
HAMILTON, supra note 56, at 223.
59
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006).
60
Id. § 2000bb(a)(4).
54
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both “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental in61
terest.” Exercising its Section 5 power to enact legislation enforcing
the Free Exercise Clause, Congress attempted to reverse the Supreme
62
Court’s decision in Smith. The Supreme Court, however, was less than
pleased with Congress’s enactment.
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court reviewed a decision by local
zoning authorities in Texas that had denied a Catholic church a build63
ing permit that would have allowed the church to expand.
The
church was built in the mission style and was too small to accommo64
date its parishioners at some Masses. Boerne authorities relied on a
recently enacted historic-preservation ordinance requiring the Historic Landmark Commission to preapprove any construction affecting
65
historic landmarks. Flores, the Catholic archbishop of San Antonio,
challenged the decision under RFRA, arguing that it imposed a substantial burden on the religious exercise of San Antonio Catholics
66
without a compelling state justification. The Court held that Congress had exceeded its remedial power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting RFRA and further held RFRA uncons67
titutional as applied against the states. RFRA still applies, however,
68
to the federal government. The major fault the Court found with
RFRA was that the law was too broad to be properly considered remedial legislation and thus constituted an impermissible attempt to
69
alter substantive constitutional rights. After the Court struck down

61

Id. § 2000bb-1.
See S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 14 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1903
(“Because the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is clearly designed to implement the
free exercise clause . . . it falls squarely within Congress’ section 5 enforcement power.”).
63
521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
64
Id. at 511-12.
65
Id. at 512.
66
Id. at 512, 529.
67
See id. at 536 (“[A]s the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond
congressional authority, it is this Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control.”).
68
See 146 CONG. REC. 19,124 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady) (“Sections
7(a)(1) and (2) and (7)(b) [of RLUIPA] collectively conform RFRA to the Supreme
Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores . . . leaving RFRA applicable only to the federal government.” (citation omitted)).
69
The Court reasoned that
62

[r]emedial legislation under § 5 “should be adapted to the mischief and
wrong which the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was intended to provide
against.”
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RFRA as overbroad, Congress responded by enacting RLUIPA to target
discrimination against religious entities by state and local governments.
D. RLUIPA
In response to the Supreme Court’s criticism in Boerne, Congress
drafted a narrower religious-freedom bill. RLUIPA is the end product
of Congress’s effort. As opposed to RFRA, which was indiscriminate
in its zeal to protect religious liberty, RLUIPA specifically targets two
areas in which governmental entities regularly make individualized assessments that may impact a person’s religious freedom: religious
land use and the religious exercise of institutionalized persons.70 By
retaining the compelling interest test only for these areas, RLUIPA fits
71
into the exception that the Court left open in Smith. The chief sponsors of RLUIPA in the Senate, Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and
Orrin Hatch of Utah, spearheaded congressional hearings that found
that the right to assemble for worship is frequently violated by state
72
and local governments. The Senators noted that discrimination often “lurks behind such vague and universally applicable reasons as
73
traffic, aesthetics, or ‘not consistent with the city’s land use plan.’”

RFRA is not so confined. Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every
level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost
every description and regardless of subject matter.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (citation omitted).
70
See 146 CONG. REC. 16,622 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady) (asserting that
RLUIPA uses Congress’s authority to protect the right to gather and worship and the
religious exercise of institutionalized persons).
71
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (“As the plurality
pointed out in [Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)], our decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”). The Supreme Court has upheld RLUIPA’s
institutionalized-persons provisions against Establishment Clause challenge. See Cutter
v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). In addition, the Second Circuit has validated
the constitutionality of RLUIPA’s land-use provisions under the Commerce Clause, the
Tenth Amendment, and the Establishment Clause. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of
Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353-56 (2d Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has not yet
passed judgment on the constitutionality of RLUIPA’s land-use provisions.
72
See 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) ( joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy on RLUIPA) (“Churches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in
particular, are frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in
the highly individualized and discretionary processes of land use regulation.”).
73
Id.
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As a result, the Senators concluded that “discrimination against reli74
gious uses is a nationwide problem” requiring a federal solution.
RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to include the “use, building,
75
or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise.”
The statute reinstates the compelling interest test for land-use regulations that impose a substantial burden on an individual’s religious exercise, unless imposition of the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of
76
Additionally,
furthering that compelling governmental interest.
RLUIPA provides that the Act “shall be construed in favor of a broad
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by
77
the terms of this [Act] and the Constitution.”
RLUIPA also seeks to remedy discrimination and exclusion in re78
ligious land use. The Equal Terms provision is one example of Congress’s remedial purpose. It is important to note at the outset that the
Discrimination and Exclusion provisions of RLUIPA operate independently of the Substantial Burden provision—that is, a plaintiff
does not have to prove a substantial burden on religious exercise to
79
state a claim under the Discrimination and Exclusion provisions.
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision, the focal point of this Comment, provides that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a
land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or in80
stitution.” The statute’s command is clear: a land-use regulation
cannot on its face or by its application treat a religious assembly or institution worse than a nonreligious assembly or institution. The legislative history explains that the Equal Terms provision “more squarely
addresses the case in which the unequal treatment of different land

74

Id. at 16,699.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B) (2006).
76
Id. §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-1(a).
77
Id. § 2000cc-3(g).
78
Id. § 2000cc(b).
79
See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th
Cir. 2003) (“[T]he substantial burden and nondiscrimination provisions are operatively independent of one another . . . .”); see also Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and Federalism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its
Impact on Local Government, 40 URB. LAW. 195, 246 (2008) (“The equal terms provision,
the courts have made clear, is conceptually distinct from RLUIPA’s substantial burden
section.”).
80
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1).
75
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81

uses does not fall into any apparent pattern.” The legislative history
further states that the Discrimination and Exclusion provisions codify
parts, but not all, of the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence
82
as applied to land-use regulation.
RLUIPA provides religious entities neither land-use immunity nor
a blanket exemption from application for variances, special permits,
83
or other relief provisions. The Equal Terms provision simply mandates equal treatment of religious and nonreligious assemblies and institutions with respect to land-use regulation.
II. THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF RLUIPA’S
EQUAL TERMS PROVISION
Understanding the background and history behind RLUIPA, we
may now proceed to examine how courts have interpreted the statute’s Equal Terms provision. Despite its apparent simplicity, RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision has raised genuine problems of interpretation for federal courts. Judges have struggled to discern exactly
what Congress meant when it proclaimed that religious assemblies
and institutions must not be treated on less than equal terms with
nonreligious assemblies and institutions. In particular, federal courts
have sent mixed messages as to what a religious plaintiff must demonstrate in order to establish an Equal Terms violation. Must religious
plaintiffs simply produce a nonreligious assembly or institution that is
permitted where the plaintiffs are not? Must they produce a nonreligious assembly or institution that is similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose of the challenged land-use regulation? If so, what does it
mean to be similarly situated? What counts as a nonreligious assembly
or institution in the first place? Do different standards apply if the
challenge to the regulation is facial or as applied? Should the standard of review applied to a challenged regulation upon a finding of
unequal treatment be strict scrutiny or strict liability? Questions such
as these abound in the case law.
While the Substantial Burden provision has generated a sizeable
body of case law, there are far fewer circuit court opinions analyzing

81

146 CONG. REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).
See id.
83
See id. at 16,700 (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy on RLUIPA) (“This Act does not provide religious institutions with immunity from land use
regulation . . . .”).
82
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84

the Equal Terms provision. Nonetheless, the Equal Terms provision
has been examined by three federal appellate courts: the Eleventh,
Seventh, and Third Circuits. The Eleventh Circuit has dealt with the
provision most extensively, and the Seventh and Third Circuits have
drawn upon the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in deciding their own
cases. A circuit split has emerged between the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits on the one hand and the Third Circuit on the other.
A. The Eleventh Circuit
Beginning in 2004, the Eleventh Circuit decided several cases interpreting the Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA. Before this Section
lays out the Eleventh Circuit’s doctrinal tests, it is helpful to note the
three kinds of potential Equal Terms statutory violations, as defined by
the Eleventh Circuit. A land-use regulation will violate RLUIPA if it is
(1) a statute that facially differentiates between religious and nonreligious assemblies or institutions; (2) a facially neutral statute that is nevertheless “gerrymandered” to place a burden solely on religious, as opposed to nonreligious, assemblies or institutions; or (3) a truly neutral
statute that is selectively enforced against religious, as opposed to nonre85
ligious[,] assemblies or institutions.

These classifications parallel the standard types of governmental
action that cause a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Midrash Se86
phardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside addresses the first type of violation,
87
while Konikov v. Orange County and Primera Iglesia Bautista of Boca Ra88
ton, Inc. v. Broward County address the third type. The second type of

84

See Daniel P. Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: The Overbroad Applications and
Troubling Implications of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805, 815
(2006) (“This second part [RLUIPA’s Discrimination and Exclusion provisions] has been
infrequently applied and seldom used by plaintiffs. Moreover, it has generally not been
attacked in the courts as either overbroad or unconstitutional.” (footnote omitted)).
85
Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450
F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006).
86
See 366 F.3d 1214, 1220 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that churches and synagogues were expressly prohibited in the business district); see also Primera, 450 F.3d at
1311 n.11 (stating that Midrash involved a facial Equal Terms challenge).
87
See 410 F.3d 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding that the Orange
County zoning code as implemented by the county violated RLUIPA); see also Primera, 450
F.3d at 1311 n.11 (stating that Konikov decided an as-applied Equal Terms challenge).
88
See 450 F.3d at 1310 (stating that Primera “essentially claim[ed]” the third type
of Equal Terms violation).
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violation contemplates cases similar to the situation brought to the Su89
preme Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.
The first, and perhaps the most influential, Eleventh Circuit case
interpreting the Equal Terms provision, Midrash, involved a zoning
90
ordinance promulgated by the town of Surfside, Florida. The ordinance contained a provision excluding churches and synagogues from
Surfside’s business district, while private clubs and lodges were per91
mitted above the first floor. Two synagogues wishing to locate in the
business district challenged the zoning ordinance as facially discrimi92
natory under the Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA. Churches and
synagogues were prohibited in seven of the eight zoning districts in
Surfside; indeed, they were only permitted in the “RD-1 two-family res93
idential district,” and even then only with a conditional-use permit.
The synagogues argued that it would be burdensome to locate in the
RD-1 district because Orthodox Judaism requires its practitioners to
94
walk to religious services. Surfside, however, argued that the ordinance was necessary “to invigorate the business district and to create a
95
strong tax base”; a synagogue ostensibly would be tax exempt. The
Eleventh Circuit invalidated the zoning ordinance, holding that
“churches and synagogues, as well as private clubs and lodges, fall with96
in the natural perimeter of ‘assembly or institution.’” Since Surfside’s
goal of “retail synergy” was pursued against religious assemblies but not
other noncommercial assemblies, the court found that the town had
97
impermissibly preferred secular motivations to religious ones.
According to the Midrash court, while the Equal Terms provision
“has the ‘feel’ of an equal protection law, it lacks the ‘similarly si98
tuated’ requirement usually found in equal protection analysis.”
Looking to the ordinary meanings of “assembly” and “institution,” the
court reasoned that a proper inquiry must first determine whether the
church or synagogue “qualifies as an ‘assembly or institution,’” then
determine “whether the governmental authority treats [it] differently
89
See 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993) (“It becomes evident that these ordinances target
Santeria sacrifice when the ordinances’ operation is considered.”).
90
366 F.3d at 1219.
91
Id. at 1220.
92
Id. at 1218-19.
93
Id. at 1219.
94
Id. at 1221.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1231.
97
Id. at 1235.
98
Id. at 1229.
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than a nonreligious assembly or institution.” Quoting Webster’s Dictionary, the court defined “assembly” as “a company of persons collected together in one place [usually] and usually for some common
purpose (as deliberation and legislation, worship, or social entertain100
ment).” “Institution” was defined to mean “an established society or
corporation: an establishment or foundation esp[ecially] of a public
character,” or “[a]n established organization, esp[ecially] one of a
101
public character.”
Under the Midrash rule, upon a finding of unequal treatment of
religious and nonreligious assemblies or institutions, the court will automatically find a violation of the Equal Terms provision, regardless of
102
any justification supplied by the zoning authority. Once a violation
of the Equal Terms provision is found, the regulation in question is by
definition deemed not neutral or not generally applicable “because
such unequal treatment indicates the ordinance improperly targets
103
Because it is relatively easy
the religious character of an assembly.”
to prove a violation of the Equal Terms provision under the Midrash
approach, however, a finding that the challenged regulation is either
not neutral or not generally applicable does not translate into automatic invalidation of the regulation. Rather, upon the finding of a vi104
olation, the regulation must pass the test of strict scrutiny. In order
for the law to survive, the governmental entity must demonstrate a
compelling justification for the classification and that the classification
105
is narrowly tailored to the government’s interest.
The Eleventh Circuit next visited RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision in 2005. In Konikov v. Orange County, the court confronted a Chabad rabbi holding services and Torah study meetings out of his
106
home. His home was located in an R-1A residential district, in which
a landowner was required to submit a $912 application to the zoning
board for a special exception if she wished to operate a religious organ99

Id. at 1230.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101
Id. at 1230-31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102
See id. at 1231 (“Because we have concluded that private clubs, churches and
synagogues fall under the umbrella of ‘assembly or institution’ as those terms are used
in RLUIPA, this differential treatment constitutes a violation of § (b)(1) of RLUIPA.”).
103
Id. at 1232.
104
Id. It should be noted that the strict scrutiny that the Eleventh Circuit applies
to the classification determines whether the challenged regulation should be invalidated, not whether there was a violation of the Equal Terms provision in the first place.
105
Id.
106
410 F.3d 1317, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
100
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ization.
Konikov never applied for a special exception.
When
Orange County cited him for violation of the zoning code, Konikov
sued, raising facial and as-applied challenges to the zoning code under
109
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision.
In assessing the distinctions made by the Orange County zoning
code (i.e., the facial challenge), the court applied the Midrash test and
found that the only permitted secular use in the R-1A zone that might
110
qualify as an assembly or institution was family day-care centers.
Nonetheless, the court held that even if family day-care centers could
qualify as assemblies or institutions, the state had a compelling justification for treating family day-care centers differently from other
groups because of the “fundamental right to freedom of personal
111
The court also found that bechoice in marriage and family life.”
cause the classification was narrowly tailored to that interest, it could
112
survive strict scrutiny.
In assessing the implementation of the Orange County zoning
code (i.e., the as-applied challenge), however, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the county had violated the Equal Terms provision of RLUI113
PA and that its classification could not survive strict scrutiny.
The
court was deeply troubled by the fact that “a group meeting with the
same frequency as Konikov’s would not violate the Code, so long as reli114
gion is not discussed.” As a result, it found that Orange County’s enforcement of the zoning code impermissibly targeted religious assem115
blies without a compelling justification.
The last stop on our tour of Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence is the
case of Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward
116
County.
Primera, a Hispanic Baptist congregation, purchased land
in the A-1 Agricultural Estate district, on which it planned to build a

107

Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1321.
109
Id. at 1321, 1324.
110
Id. at 1325-26.
111
Id. at 1326; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(plurality opinion) (“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974))).
112
Konikov, 410 F.3d at 1327.
113
Id. at 1329.
114
Id. at 1328.
115
Id. at 1329.
116
450 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006).
108
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117

church.
The land, however, was situated within 1000 feet of other
nonresidential, nonagricultural uses, in violation of a separation re118
The “stated purpose” of
quirement applicable to the A-1 district.
this requirement was “to protect, preserve and enhance the rural cha119
racter and lifestyle of the existing low density areas.” On the advice
of counsel, Primera applied for a zoning variance, which was denied
by the Board of Adjustment twice, but continued to hold services in
120
violation of the separation requirement. Primera then brought suit
under the Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA, claiming that the Broward County Preparatory School, a secular institution located in the
121
same A-1 district, had been granted rezoning. The Eleventh Circuit
held that Primera had not demonstrated a violation of the Equal
Terms provision because it had failed to present a similarly situated
122
The court found that the school was not simisecular comparator.
larly situated to Primera because “they sought markedly different
forms of zoning relief, from different decision-making bodies, under
123
sharply different provisions of local law.”
In its reasoning, the court revisited its holding in Konikov. Noting
that Konikov involved an as-applied challenge to a land-use regulation,
the court stated that Konikov “stands for the proposition that a neutral
statute’s application may violate the Equal Terms provision if it differentially treats similarly situated religious and nonreligious assem124
blies.”
This is a more stringent standard than the Midrash rule,
which requires only that the religious assembly or institution present a
better-treated secular entity that falls into the “natural perimeter” of
125
“assembly or institution.” The Eleventh Circuit found that in an asapplied challenge, the Konikov court had engaged in a similarly situated analysis; it thus ruled that Konikov controlled in the as-applied
126
The court’s primary concern in Primera was that religious
context.
117

Id. at 1300.
Id.
119
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
120
Id. at 1301-02.
121
Id. Note that Primera had applied to the Board of Adjustment for a zoning variance. The Broward County Preparatory School, on the other hand, had applied to the
county for rezoning, a different remedy administered by a different board. Id. at 1300-02.
122
Id. at 1313.
123
Id. at 1311.
124
Id.
125
See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 & n.12
(11th Cir. 2004) (describing Justice Harlan’s “natural perimeter” test).
126
Primera, 450 F.3d at 1311 n.11.
118
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entities be given “equal treatment, not special treatment,” under
127
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision.
The Eleventh Circuit’s construction of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms
provision is the most comprehensive we have. The Seventh and Third
Circuit opinions in this area largely respond to the precedent set by
the Eleventh Circuit.
B. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has heard two major cases construing the
Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA. In the first of those cases, Vision
Church v. Village of Long Grove, a Korean congregation owned land in
unincorporated Lake County, Illinois, on which it planned to build a
church.128 The congregation, however, wanted the church to be within the boundaries of the Village of Long Grove proper, not in unincorporated Lake County, so it applied for voluntary annexation into
129
the Village of Long Grove. Church use was permitted on the property under Lake County’s Zoning Code but not under the Village’s
without a special-use permit; therefore, the church made its applica130
tion for annexation conditional on the grant of a special-use permit.
Citing concerns about the size of the church and Vision’s refusal to
assent to other conditions desired by the Village, the Village denied
131
Vision’s application for annexation.
At the same time, a local real estate developer whose property surrounded Vision’s property on all sides applied for voluntary annexa132
tion.
After denying Vision’s application, the Village quickly approved the developer’s and then took advantage of a provision of
Illinois law allowing a municipality to involuntarily annex property sur133
rounded on all sides by property within the Village’s boundaries.
The Village zoned Vision’s property “R2 Residential,” as requested by
Vision, but the involuntary annexation terminated Vision’s applica134
tion for the requisite special-use permit to operate as a church.
Shortly thereafter, the Village amended its Assembly Ordinance to re-

127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 1313.
468 F.3d 975, 981 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 981-82.
Id.
Id. at 982.
Id. at 983.
Id.
Id. at 983 & n.5.
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strict the size of buildings used for public assembly.
Vision later
reapplied for a special-use permit, but the permit was denied because
the size of the proposed facility exceeded the permissible square foo136
tage under the Assembly Ordinance. Although the Seventh Circuit
cited Konikov for the proposition that a religious group and a nonreligious group need not be similarly situated in all relevant respects for
purposes of the Equal Terms provision comparison, it did not hold for
137
Arguing that elementary schools were exempt from the reVision.
quirement, Vision apparently had challenged only the special-use
138
permit requirement, not the questionable Assembly Ordinance. As
a result, the court found Vision’s comparison to elementary schools
139
The court
unpersuasive under the rules of Konikov and Primera.
held that Vision had not demonstrated an Equal Terms statutory vi140
olation as defined in Primera.
The next case to examine the Equal Terms provision in the Se141
venth Circuit was Digrugilliers v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis.
In
that case, the Baptist Church of the West Side had been conducting
142
church services out of a building zoned “C-1.” Under Indianapolis’s
zoning code, the church’s building was considered a “religious use,”
143
which was not permitted in a C-1 district without a zoning variance.
Various secular assemblies and institutions, along with their corresponding commercial accessory uses, were allowed in the C-1 district
144
without a variance. The Pastor did not apply for a zoning variance;
instead, he brought suit alleging that “the requirement of obtaining a
variance in order to make a religious use of land” violated the Equal
145
The district court held for the city,
Terms provision of RLUIPA.
reasoning that because the zoning code permitted religious land users
to enjoy certain residential uses (e.g., use of a rectory for the minister),
allowing religious use in the C-1 district without a variance would give
135

Id. at 983-84.
Id. at 984.
137
Id. at 1002-03.
138
Id. at 1003.
139
Id.
140
See id. (“[T]he fact that Vision and the elementary schools were subject to different standards because of the year in which their special use applications were considered compels the conclusion that there was no unequal treatment.”).
141
506 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2007).
142
Id. at 614.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 614-15.
145
Id. at 614.
136
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religious entities “rights greater than rather than equal to” those of
146
secular entities.
In an opinion by Judge Posner, however, the Seventh Circuit vindicated the church. The court held that
the City may not, by defining religious use so expansively as to bestow on
churches in districts in which it allows them to operate more rights than
identical secular users of land have, justify excluding churches from districts in which, were it not for those superadded rights, the exclusion
147
would be discriminatory.

To hold otherwise, reasoned Judge Posner, would be to allow local
governments to zone out religious entities simply by defining religious
148
use to permit an activity forbidden for secular use in the same zone.
Vision and Digrugilliers thus exemplify the Seventh Circuit’s willingness
to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s lead in construing the Equal Terms
149
provision of RLUIPA.
C. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit has explicitly repudiated the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits in its leading case interpreting the Equal Terms provi150
sion, Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch. In
Lighthouse, “a Christian church . . . seek[ing] to minister to the poor
and disadvantaged in downtown Long Branch, New Jersey,” purchased
151
property in the C-1 Central Commercial District. Assembly halls and
152
theaters were permitted in the C-1 district, but churches were not.
Lighthouse sought permission to use its property for religious purpos153
es but was only allowed to use it as an office. Lighthouse sued for a
preliminary injunction, attacking the ordinance both facially and as
146

Id. at 615.
Id.
148
Id.
149
Indeed, although the Seventh Circuit has not issued an opinion interpreting
the Equal Terms provision since the circuit split emerged, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois has opined that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach is
more consistent with Digrugilliers than it is with the Third Circuit’s approach, in terms
of the appropriateness of considering protective zones in Equal Terms provision analysis. See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, No. 08-0950, 2008 WL
4865568, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2008) (noting that the Seventh Circuit cited approvingly to the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in at least two prior cases). The Seventh
Circuit also has not examined the standard of review applicable to a challenged regulation upon a finding of unequal treatment.
150
510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007).
151
Id. at 256-57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
152
Id. at 257.
153
Id.
147
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154

applied. All claims were dismissed as either unexhausted or unripe,
and the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a prelimi155
nary injunction.
While this litigation was pending, Long Branch adopted a redevelopment plan that “strictly limited the use of properties within the
156
‘Broadway Corridor’ area,” where the church’s property was located.
The plan superseded the ordinance and was adopted in order to increase retail revenues for business owners and tax revenues for the
157
158
Churches were not permitted in the Broadway Corridor.
city.
Lighthouse tried to qualify as a developer so as to retain the ability to
make use of its property, but this request was denied by the City
Council because “a church would ‘destroy the ability of the block to
be used as a high end entertainment and recreation area’ due to a
New Jersey statute which prohibits the issuance of liquor licenses with159
Lighthouse then chalin two hundred feet of a house of worship.”
160
lenged the plan as violative of the Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA.
The Third Circuit held that “a religious plaintiff under the Equal
Terms Provision must identify a better-treated secular comparator that
is similarly situated in regard to the objectives of the challenged regulation”—something Lighthouse had not, and perhaps could not have,
161
The court further held that when a violation of the Equal
done.
Terms provision is found, the standard should be strict liability, not
162
strict scrutiny. As a result, the court upheld summary judgment for
Long Branch with respect to the plan, finding that the plan did not
154

Id.
Id.; see also Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 100 F.
App’x 70, 77 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that Lighthouse’s Equal Terms claim had failed
because Lighthouse did not present a similarly situated secular comparator and because it was unclear whether its property would have been approved for church use
had it applied as an “assembly hall”).
156
Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 258.
157
Id.
158
See id. (“Churches were not listed as a permitted use . . . [and] the Plan provided that ‘[a]ny uses not specifically listed’ were prohibited.”).
159
Id. at 259.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 268, 277 (emphasis omitted).
162
Id. at 269. This standard differs from the Eleventh Circuit test laid out in Midrash. Under the Third Circuit’s test, the religious plaintiff must first produce a bettertreated secular assembly or institution that is similarly situated as to the purpose of the
regulation at issue. If the court decides that the secular group is both similarly situated
and better treated than the religious group, the government will be held strictly liable
for violation of the Equal Terms provision. Note that this approach entirely bypasses
the compelling interest (or strict scrutiny) test that RLUIPA seeks to revive.
155
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163

violate the Equal Terms provision.
The court found that although
the plan permitted nonreligious assemblies such as theaters in the
Broadway Corridor, it did not permit any secular “assemblies or institutions whose presence would cause no lesser harm to the redevelop164
ment and revitalization of the Corridor” than the church. The court
stressed the difficulty of creating a vibrant downtown if “sizeable areas
of the Broadway Corridor were not available for the issuance of liquor
165
licenses.” The Third Circuit, however, reversed the grant of summary
judgment for Long Branch on the ordinance issue and then ordered
summary judgment for Lighthouse; it found that the ordinance violated
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision because, during discovery, the term
166
“assembly hall” was determined not to encompass religious use.
The court reasoned that the Equal Terms provision requires
something more than just the “identif[ication] [of] any nonreligious
assembly or institution that enjoys better terms”: one must consider
the objectives of the regulation as well as the characteristics of the se167
cular and religious comparators.
The court asserted that Congress
had intended to codify existing Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence,
which—as the court described in painstaking detail—required comparing how a regulation treated secular entities or behaviors that had
168
The Third Circuit
the same effect on the regulation’s objectives.
expressly declined to adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s “expansive” reading
of the statute because, according to the court, such a reading would
assume “that Congress intended to force local governments to give
any and all religious entities a free pass to locate wherever any secular
169
assembly or institution is allowed.”
163

Id. at 272.
Id. at 270.
165
Id. at 270-71. Under a state statute, liquor licenses could not be issued “in the
vicinity of houses of worship.” Id.
166
Id. at 272-73.
167
Id. at 264.
168
Id. at 264-65.
169
Id. at 268, 269 n.14. Since the Third Circuit’s opinion in Lighthouse was handed
down, two relevant district court opinions have discussed it in detail. In Third Church of
Christ v. City of New York, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
analyzed the plaintiff’s claim under the Eleventh Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and Third
Circuit tests and decided that the Equal Terms provision was violated under all three.
617 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The court thus refused to express an
opinion as to which test would prevail in the Second Circuit. Id. In Centro Familiar
Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona did not apply the similarly situated secular comparator test of Lighthouse; rather, it
focused on the Eleventh Circuit’s and the Third Circuit’s invocations of principles of
neutrality and general applicability to deny the religious institution’s Equal Terms
164
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In fashioning its doctrinal test, the majority opinion focused more
heavily on Third Circuit Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence than on
the statutory text. Judge Jordan, in his dissent, capitalized on precisely this point. As Judge Jordan succinctly put it, “In less legalistic language, we are asked whether religion can be made to take a back seat
170
to a City’s economic development goals.” The dissent took notice of
the majority’s fear that the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation would
“make rational zoning impossible whenever a church was in the mix,”
but it responded by arguing that RLUIPA does no more than prevent
a religious assembly or institution from being excluded when a secular
171
assembly or institution is allowed.
Judge Jordan also took issue with the majority’s analysis because,
although Congress intended to codify parts of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence when it enacted RLUIPA, it did not necessarily mean to
172
replicate that analysis completely.
For Judge Jordan, the starting
point of the majority’s analysis should have been the text of the statute
173
that Congress chose to enact. The dissent also correctly pointed out
that RLUIPA was enacted using Congress’s Section 5 power, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, to enforce the Free Exercise Clause and that
importing a similarly situated secular comparator requirement would
174
in fact frustrate that intent by making the Act harder to enforce. In
sum, the dissent concluded that there was no legitimate basis for the
majority’s grafting of additional requirements onto the statute.
III. WHY THE MIDRASH APPROACH PROVIDES THE BEST INTERPRETIVE
FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF
EQUAL TERMS CHALLENGES
Undoubtedly, religious entities’ land uses create thorny and controversial issues. For example, a common argument against RLUIPA’s
land-use provisions is that they permit religious groups to wantonly

challenge. See 615 F. Supp. 2d 980, 996-1000 (D. Ariz. 2009) (holding that the city had
shown that a neutral and generally applicable principle justified its conditional-use
permit requirement for religious and similar secular groups, thus qualifying the city’s
regulation for rational basis review).
170
Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 278 ( Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171
Id. at 286.
172
See id. at 287-88 (“Viewing a RLUIPA claim as the precise equivalent of a Free
Exercise Claim renders the statute superfluous.”).
173
Id. at 288.
174
Id. at 293-94.
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flout generally applicable land-use regulations. Indeed, some courts
seem to find the Equal Terms provision itself objectionable. Their arguments imply that RLUIPA does not seek to treat religious entities
on equal terms with nonreligious entities but rather to treat religious
176
assemblies and institutions better than their secular counterparts.
Given these concerns, the Midrash approach best reconciles the competing interests of religious and secular groups. Furthermore, of all
the interpretive approaches to Equal Terms challenges detailed above,
the interpretation of the Midrash court is most consistent with the text
and purpose of RLUIPA.
To prevent what it perceived to be a potential constitutional prob177
lem, the Third Circuit imposed more stringent requirements on religious plaintiffs than those found in the text of RLUIPA. The Third
Circuit’s approach is two-pronged: First, it prevents religious plaintiffs
from stating a claim under the Equal Terms provision unless they can
demonstrate that there exists a secular assembly or institution similarly
situated to the religious entity as to the purpose of the challenged regulation. Second, if unequal treatment is established, the government
is held strictly liable for violating the statute. Likewise, in Primera, the
178
Eleventh Circuit read a similarly situated requirement into Konikov.
The question remains, however, whether the best interpretive approach to remedy a perceived injustice is to rewrite the text of a statute constitutionally passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law by the President.
The Third Circuit is not alone in its concern that statutes like
RLUIPA in fact confer more rights on religious entities than on their
secular counterparts. Hamilton argues in God vs. the Gavel that home175

See, e.g., Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 717, 738 (2008) (“To others, RLUIPA
unnecessarily interferes with local governments’ ability to enforce generally applicable
land use regulation and creates an overly broad exemption that allows religious institutions to avoid a community’s reasonable land-use concerns.”).
176
See supra text accompanying note 169 (noting the Third Circuit’s concern that
such an interpretation could “force local governments to give any and all religious entities a free pass” in location decisions).
177
See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 267 n.11 (declining to reach the question of RLUIPA’s constitutionality under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Campbell, supra note 14, at 1089 (“Even though Long Branch failed to argue that the equal
terms provision would be unconstitutional under the interpretation advanced by Lighthouse . . . , the court nevertheless included a lengthy footnote explaining that its limiting construction avoided concerns about the constitutionality of the provision.”).
178
See Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450
F.3d 1295, 1311 n.11 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Konikov[] decided an as-applied Equal Terms
challenge by engaging in a similarly situated analysis.”).
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owners have reason to fear that they will “go to sleep in a quiet residential enclave and wake up next door to a proposed 150-car parking
179
Similar statements
lot” without meaningful recourse to the courts.
180
abound in the literature examining RLUIPA. Fortunately, however,
such fears are unfounded. The Midrash test, which does not add a similarly situated requirement and relies on strict scrutiny of the challenged regulation upon a finding of unequal treatment, is more than
adequate to the task.
A. The Circuit Split
The federal appellate court decisions construing the Equal Terms
181
provision essentially create a two-pronged doctrinal framework. The
Eleventh Circuit and the Third Circuit apply different standards under each prong of the analysis. In order to state a claim under the
Equal Terms provision, the religious plaintiff must show that there is
(1) a land-use regulation, (2) a religious assembly or institution, (3) a
nonreligious assembly or institution, and (4) some evidence that the
nonreligious entity is better treated. The standard applicable to each
prong has an enormous effect on the outcome in a given case.
The first prong involves determining whether the case includes
the requisite entities and whether the secular entity is treated better
than the religious one. The Eleventh Circuit maintains that, at least
in a facial challenge, the plaintiff need only produce one religious and
one secular assembly or institution, as defined by Webster; if the secular one is treated better than the religious one, unequal treatment is
182
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, maintains that
established.
Congress could not possibly have meant to include all secular assemblies or institutions in the comparison; only those assemblies or institutions that are similarly situated to the religious plaintiff with respect

179

HAMILTON, supra note 56, at 79; see also id. at 78-82 (cataloguing the problems
of parking, traffic, lights, and noise that the modern religious congregation imposes
on suburbs).
180
See, e.g., Lennington, supra note 84, at 805 (creating a hypothetical in which a
pastor purchases a home next door to the reader’s with plans to raze it in order to
build his dream church).
181
See Campbell, supra note 14, at 1085-86. For simplicity, I compare the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach with the Third Circuit’s, because the Seventh Circuit followed the
Eleventh Circuit on the first prong and has not yet addressed the second prong.
182
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230-31 (11th
Cir. 2004).
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to the purpose of the challenged regulation are relevant.
To take
the Lighthouse example, if a liquor license cannot be issued within 500
feet of a church or school, and a zoning regulation excludes only
churches from a zone for this reason, the religious plaintiff cannot
produce the Rotary Club as an example of a better-treated secular entity. The Rotary Club does not affect liquor licensing in the zone. Instead, the church must produce a better-treated school because a
school would also interrupt liquor licensing. A school is the only secular entity that is similarly situated to the church as to the purpose of
the challenged regulation, which is to avoid liquor-licensing interruptions and create a vibrant downtown. The standard employed at this
stage matters because it determines which plaintiffs will be able to
state a claim. In the Eleventh Circuit, more plaintiffs get through the
door; in the Third Circuit, very few can pass.
The second prong involves the standard of review applied to the
challenged land-use regulation. The Eleventh Circuit applies strict
184
scrutiny. The court examines the government’s justifications for the
regulation in great detail because more plaintiffs cross the threshold
under the first prong. If the regulation fails strict scrutiny, it is invalidated; if the government demonstrates a narrowly tailored compelling
interest, it stands. The Third Circuit, on the other hand, does not apply strict scrutiny. Because it is so difficult to get through the door
under the first prong, if a plaintiff can prove unequal treatment under
the similarly situated test, the challenged regulation is automatically
185
invalidated.
It appears that the second prong of the Equal Terms test is the
operative one in the Eleventh Circuit, while the first prong is instrumental in the Third Circuit. In the Eleventh Circuit, it is easy for the
religious plaintiff to get through the door under the first prong (at
least in a facial challenge), but the government gets a chance to prove
that it has a compelling interest under the second prong. In the
Third Circuit, it is very difficult for the religious plaintiff to get
through the door under the first prong, but if it does, it wins under
the second prong.
Lighthouse deals a significant blow to religious entities seeking to
exercise their statutory rights under RLUIPA by creating the requirement that a religious assembly or institution produce not only a bet183

Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266
(3d Cir. 2007).
184
Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1232.
185
See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269.
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ter-treated secular assembly or institution but also one that is similarly
situated as to the purpose of the challenged regulation. The eventual
resolution of this circuit split by the Supreme Court would ultimately
clear up this doctrinal confusion by determining which interpretation
of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision should prevail.
B. The Similarly Situated Secular Comparator Requirement
The Third Circuit argued that without the similarly situated secular comparator requirement, religious entities will be immune from
land-use regulation. A textual interpretation of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms
provision, however, does not allow religious assemblies and institutions
to locate wherever they please. It does not absolve religious entities
186
from compliance with neutral and generally applicable special-permit
187
and variance requirements.
It simply prevents local governments
from discriminating against religious assemblies and institutions by
excluding or hampering them when secular assemblies and institu188
Therefore, the fearful homeowner in
tions are not so burdened.
Hamilton’s hypothetical need worry that a strange new church and its
150-space parking lot could one day set up shop next door only if the
189
local Rotary Club would be permitted to do the same. So long as
the Rotary Club is excluded, the church may be excluded as well.
Contrary to the opinion of RLUIPA’s detractors, the church will not
be permitted to flout applicable land-use regulations and locate wherever it pleases.
1. The Third Circuit’s Fears
The Third Circuit was reluctant to give the Equal Terms provision
a broad construction in Lighthouse because it believed that such a
“reading of the statute would lead to the conclusion that Congress in186

The challenged requirement in Digrugilliers was not generally applicable; rather, only religious land users had to apply for a zoning variance in order to make use
of their land. See Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 614 (7th
Cir. 2007) (“A religious use is forbidden in C-1 districts without a zoning variance.”).
187
Neutral and generally applicable laws do not admit of religious exemption. See
supra text accompanying note 48.
188
See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1242 (11th Cir.
2004) (“While RLUIPA may preempt laws that discriminate against or exclude religious institutions entirely, it leaves individual states free to eliminate the discrimination
in any way they choose, so long as the discrimination is actually eliminated.”).
189
The Rotary Club is an international community service organization. Rotary
Int’l, History of Rotary International, http://www.rotary.org/en/AboutUs/History/
RIHistory/Pages/ridefault.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
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tended to force local governments to give any and all religious entities
a free pass to locate wherever any secular institution or assembly is al190
Recent trends in religious land use have some courts and
lowed.”
commentators worried that special treatment for religion will become
the rule. In Hamilton’s view, for example, religious land use has undergone a “paradigm shift” in recent years. Hamilton argues that
[u]nfortunately for their neighbors, although favorable for the recipients of their services, contemporary houses of worship . . . are now a
locus for social services, as well as a center for worship and entertainment. The thriving religious entities have sizeable buildings, with seating for hundreds—maybe thousands, along with heavy traffic, intense
parking needs, and even bus transportation into the neighborhood from
191
off site.

This statement is undoubtedly true. Houses of worship have certainly expanded in recent years, thus creating all of the benefits and
drawbacks associated with large groups of people congregating in one
place. What is puzzling, however, is why problems of building size,
parking, and traffic are bemoaned as though they apply only to religious land use and not to the land use of secular assemblies or institutions. The peculiar problems associated with religious land use are in
fact issues confronted wherever land is used by a sizeable assembly or
192
Secular assemblies and institutions require buildings, a
institution.
physical plant, and parking. If secular assemblies and institutions are
thus permitted while religious ones are excluded, then the problems
such exclusion seeks to address will remain unsolved.
As a result, the Third Circuit’s fear that an Equal Terms provision
without a similarly situated secular comparator requirement will make
rational zoning impossible is also unfounded. A municipality wishing
entirely to prevent a church from locating in a particular district need
193
only ban all other secular assemblies and institutions.

190

Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268.
HAMILTON, supra note 5657, at 79.
192
See 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) ( joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy on RLUIPA) (“Churches have been denied the right to meet in rented storefronts, in abandoned schools, in converted funeral homes, theaters, and skating
rinks—in all sorts of buildings that were permitted when they generated traffic for secular purposes.”).
193
A related concern is that an Equal Terms provision without a similarly situated
requirement would be unconstitutionally overbroad under Boerne. For a discussion of
why a textual interpretation of the Equal Terms provision would be constitutional under Boerne, see Campbell, supra note 14, at 1094-99.
191
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The Lighthouse court, however, remained troubled by what it saw
as a slippery slope, arguing that according to the Eleventh Circuit,
if a town allows a local, ten-member book club to meet in the senior center, it must also permit a large church with a thousand members—or . . .
a religious assembly with rituals involving sacrificial killings of animals or
the participation of wild bears—to locate in the same neighborhood regardless of the impact such a religious entity might have on the envi194
sioned character of the area.

This comparison seems inapposite. If a thousand-member book
club would not be allowed in a particular zone, a thousand-member
church could not credibly claim that it is being treated on less than
195
equal terms, even if the ten-member book club would be allowed.
On the other hand, if a thousand-member book club would be allowed in the zone, the church should not be penalized for the fact
that the book club currently has only ten members. The similarly situated requirement strives to make explicit the fact that a thousandmember church should not necessarily be treated the same way as a
ten-member book club, at least in an as-applied Equal Terms challenge. The Midrash test, however, achieves the same result while
doing less damage to the statutory text.
Lighthouse makes it harder for plaintiffs to assert their rights under
a statute enacted to protect them but easier for judges to achieve their
own desired policy results. In Lighthouse, Long Branch argued that
“churches are by their nature not likely to foster the kind of extendedhours traffic and synergetic spending it wishes to foster in the Broad196
way Corridor” and that the New Jersey liquor laws “would hinder the
development of the kind of modern entertainment-oriented district
197
Lighthouse offered to waive its right
that Long Branch envisages.”
to enforce the liquor laws in perpetuity, but because each new licensee would require a new waiver, the court rejected this as giving the
church “unacceptable control over the development of the downtown
198
As a result, while secular assemblies and institutions such as
area.”
194

Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268 (citations omitted).
Some might argue that a judge would feel constrained to apply the text of this
statute to sanction such an absurd result, but even the “plain meaning” rule of statutory
construction provides an exception for absurd results. See infra subsection III.A.2.
196
510 F.3d at 270.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 271. It would of course be unconstitutional for Long Branch to pass a law
giving religious authorities veto power over the issuance of liquor licenses, but a
church’s voluntary waiver of its own rights under a statute seems like a different issue.
See generally Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116, 117, 127 (1982) (holding that a
195
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theaters, performance venues, restaurants, bars, clubs, culinary
schools, and dance studios were all permitted in the Broadway Corri199
dor, the church was not. By finding that the secular groups and the
religious group were not similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose, the court essentially found that the teaching of cooking skills or
the worship of artists and musicians would cause less harm to Long
Branch’s redevelopment goals than the teaching of life skills to the
poor or the worship of God. It would be difficult to argue, however,
that Lighthouse was treated on equal terms with the array of secular
200
groups permitted in the Broadway Corridor.
The Third Circuit’s test practically guaranteed Long Branch’s success because only a religious entity or a school could cause the liquorlicensing interruptions at issue in Lighthouse. A secular assembly or institution other than a private school could never be similarly situated
to Lighthouse in this respect. The similarly situated requirement allowed the Third Circuit to shut the door on Lighthouse’s claim with201
out passing on the justifications for Long Branch’s regulation. The
Midrash test, however, likely would have found unequal treatment,
leading to a violation of the Equal Terms provision, after which the
burden would have shifted to the government to demonstrate a compelling state interest and to prove that the classification was narrowly
tailored to that interest. Long Branch would have been less likely to
succeed under this test, but it would have had a fair opportunity to
show a compelling state interest. More importantly, after application
of the Midrash test, the text of the statute would remain a reliable
guide for those who must obey Congress’s command.

Massachusetts law giving churches and schools veto power over the issuance of liquor
licenses to venues located within 500 feet of a church or school violates the Establishment Clause).
199
Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 270.
200
Recall Judge Posner’s point in Digrugilliers:
Government cannot, by granting churches special privileges (the right of a
church official to reside in a building in a nonresidential district, or the right
of the church to be free from offensive land uses in its vicinity), furnish the
premise for excluding churches from otherwise suitable districts.
Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 2007).
201
See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 270 (“We do not need to reach the question whether
a church by its very nature is unlikely to contribute to the development of a vibrant
and vital downtown . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Campbell, supra
note 14, at 1101 (“[The Third Circuit’s interpretation] removed the government’s
regulatory objectives from judicial scrutiny.”).
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2. Principles of Statutory Construction
The Midrash test is also more consistent with the text and purpose
of RLUIPA and further accords with accepted principles of statutory
construction. As Campbell notes, “courts may give a statute a narrow202
ing interpretation to preserve its constitutionality,” but Campbell
argues that the use of this avoidance canon in Lighthouse was inappropriate in part because the Third Circuit’s interpretation contradicted
203
congressional intent. The Third Circuit, as well as the Eleventh Circuit in Primera, departed from the statutory text in fashioning their
doctrinal tests. Although the issue is hotly contested in the academic
literature, the Supreme Court has historically disfavored resort to legislative history and other indicia of congressional intent when the text
204
of a statute is clear. With the exception of the period between 1940
and 1986, the Court has either criticized the use of legislative history
in statutory interpretation or subscribed to what has become known as
205
the “plain meaning” rule. The plain-meaning rule states that “where
the language of an enactment is clear and construction according to
its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the
words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the mean206
Under the plain-meaning rule, resort to traditional
ing intended.”
indicia of legislative intent may be appropriate where the text of a statute is ambiguous, but not otherwise.
The term “legislative intent,” however, may be something of a
misnomer. It is unclear whether it is possible to discern the “intent”

202

Campbell, supra note 14, at 1094.
Id. at 1094. For Campbell’s full explanation of why the Third Circuit’s use of
the avoidance canon was inappropriate, see id. at 1093-1105.
204
See JOSEPH L. GERKEN, WHAT GOOD IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY? 39-40 (2007) (describing the historical evolution of the Supreme Court’s treatment of legislative history
in statutory interpretation).
205
Id. Between 1940 and 1986, the Court rejected the plain-meaning rule, holding in United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns that “[w]hen aid to construction of the
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no rule of
law which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on superficial examination.” 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). Since then, the Supreme Court, spearheaded by the advocacy of Justice Scalia,
has indicated its intent to return to the plain-meaning rule. See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (stating the plainmeaning rule as a legitimate approach to statutory interpretation). But cf. WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13 (1994) (arguing that “all originalist theories fail” in part because “none of them adequately describes what American agencies and courts do when they interpret statutes”).
206
United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929).
203
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of a multimember body.
What can be discerned, however, is the
meaning of the statutory text that Congress voted to enact and that
the President signed. Indeed, the text may be the best indication of
legislative intent. While legislative history can be useful in parsing the
language of unclear statutory text, such sources should be an aid to
understanding the statute, not primary authority of equal weight.
Where legislative history and clear statutory text conflict, the statutory
208
text should always control.
The overriding problem with the Third Circuit’s test is that it liberates courts from the text of the Equal Terms provision. This is apparent from the Lighthouse opinion itself. When discussing the standard of review to be applied to the challenged land-use regulation, the
Third Circuit stated that “[s]ince the Substantial Burden section includes a strict scrutiny provision and the Discrimination and Exclusion section does not, we conclude this ‘disparate exclusion’ was part
209
of the intent of Congress and not an oversight.” The court was not
correspondingly troubled, however, by the lack of a similarly situated
requirement in the text of the Equal Terms provision. There, the
court concluded, based on the intent of Congress and its own Free
Exercise opinions, that a similarly situated requirement was mandated
210
by the statute.
The text of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision does not contain a
211
similarly situated requirement.
Furthermore, the statute clearly
states that it should be construed to the maximum breadth permissi-

207

The argument that “legislative intention is either undiscoverable or unpalatably
selfish,” CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 182 (2002), has been difficult to overcome. See id. at 183 (arguing
that even Justice Breyer has been unable to explain sufficiently why and how legislative
purpose or intent should control statutory interpretation).
208
See, e.g., Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir.
2005) (“When a law sensibly could be read in multiple ways, legislative history may
help a court understand which of these received the political branches’ imprimatur.
But when the legislative history stands by itself, as a naked expression of ‘intent’ unconnected to any enacted text, it has no more force than an opinion poll of legislators—less, really, as it speaks for fewer.”).
209
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 269
(3d Cir. 2007).
210
Id. at 264-68.
211
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006) (“No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution
on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”).
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212

ble to protect religious exercise, which RLUIPA defines to include
religious land use.213 In this case, the statutory command is clear: “No
government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a
manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than
214
equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.” The Third
Circuit, however, focused on the “intent” of Congress to codify Third
215
Circuit Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits duly noted that the statute
clearly demands a comparison. Otherwise, it would be impossible to
know whether a religious assembly or institution was being treated on
less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution. But
that is as far as the statute goes. The Eleventh Circuit in Midrash understood the text to mean that a religious entity need only show that
there exists a secular assembly or institution, similarly situated to the
religious entity by virtue of its status as an assembly or institution, that is
better treated on the face of a land-use regulation or by its application.
In contrast, the Third Circuit ignored the statutory text, preferring to
interpret Congress’s intent as codification of those Free Exercise Clause
cases cited by the court. Consequently, the Third Circuit, as well as the
Eleventh Circuit in Primera, imported into RLUIPA with little textual
support the similarly situated secular comparator requirement from
216
judicial opinions construing the Equal Protection Clause.
Even if we were to rely on the legislative history of RLUIPA as our
primary guide to statutory construction, the Midrash test is superior.
The legislative history states that Congress intended to codify aspects,
not all, of the existing Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, and, as duly noted in the Lighthouse dissent, Congress’s stated goal in enacting
212

See id. § 2000cc-3(g) (“This chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this
chapter and the Constitution.”).
213
See id. § 2000cc-5(7)(B) (“The use, building, or conversion of real property for
the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the
person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that purpose.”).
214
Id. § 2000cc(b)(1).
215
See Lighthouse , 510 F.3d at 266 (“We see that the Free Exercise jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court and of this Court teaches that the relevant comparison for purposes of a Free Exercise challenge to a regulation is between its treatment of certain religious conduct and the analogous secular conduct that has a similar impact on the regulation’s aims.”).
216
See id. at 293 ( Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]ncorporating into RLUIPA the type of ‘similarly situated’ analysis embedded in equal protection cases would frustrate Congress’s intention of enforcing the Free Exercise Clause,
because it would make it very difficult for religious assemblies to qualify for relief . . . .”).
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the bill was to restore the compelling interest test and maintain the
protection for religious liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. In its
attempt to give life to Congress’s intent, the Third Circuit ignored the
reason why RLUIPA was brought to the floor of Congress in the first
place: to take advantage of the space that the Smith opinion left open
for the protection of religious exercise.
C. Strict Liability Versus Strict Scrutiny
The second prong of the Midrash test is also preferable to that of
the Third Circuit’s test. Under Lighthouse, a court imposes a strictliability standard on the government upon a finding of unequal
treatment under the first prong. The Midrash test, on the other hand,
requires judges to apply strict scrutiny to the challenged regulation
upon a finding of unequal treatment. Although the text of the Equal
Terms provision provides a strong argument against applying strict
scrutiny, the text and purpose of RLUIPA taken as a whole support a
strict scrutiny approach.
The Third Circuit expressed concern over applying strict scrutiny
to a challenged regulation because the text of the Equal Terms provision, unlike that of the Substantial Burden provision, does not ex217
pressly provide for such searching judicial review. Campbell agrees,
as she advocates a strictly textual interpretation of the statute, one that
218
disavows both a “similarly situated” requirement and strict scrutiny.
She argues that the Midrash approach is flawed because it provides “an
escape hatch to governments capable of showing that their unequal
treatment of religious assemblies is the least restrictive means of fur219
As a result, for Campthering a compelling government interest.”
bell, only a purely textual interpretation of the Equal Terms provision
would prevent contradiction of the statute’s text, frustration of con220
gressional intent, and weakening of protections for religious liberty.
While Campbell’s concerns are valid and worth considering, there
are several compelling reasons for keeping the Midrash court’s strict
217

Campbell, supra note 14, at 1100.
See id. at 1093 (“[T]his Note argues that courts should interpret the statute according to its express terms, which do not include a similarly situated requirement or a
compelling interest test.”).
219
Id. at 1103. Campbell does admit, however, that because the Midrash approach
addresses the criticism that the Equal Terms provision impermissibly interferes with
local government, it is “at least marginally better than using the Third Circuit’s similarly situated requirement.” Id. at 1104.
220
Id. at 1093-1104.
218
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scrutiny prong. RLUIPA was enacted in the wake of Smith and was
narrowly drawn to fit into the exception for individualized assessments
left open by the Court in that case. Under Smith and Lukumi, the
compelling interest test governs cases in which the government has in
place a system of individualized assessments that is either not neutral
or not generally applicable and that burdens religious exercise. That
is why RLUIPA is addressed specifically to religious land use and the
religious exercise of institutionalized persons: both activities involve
individualized governmental assessments that may determine whether
an individual may freely exercise her religion. As a result, in the context of land-use regulation, the compelling interest test should control.
The text and legislative history of RLUIPA support this conclusion. RLUIPA provides that it “shall be construed in favor of a broad
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by
221
the terms of this [Act] and the Constitution.” The legislative history
further states that the Discrimination and Exclusion provisions “codif[y] parts of the Supreme Court’s constitutional tests as applied to
222
It appears, therefore, that the Equal Terms
land use regulation.”
provision would, at a minimum, codify the basic rules of Smith and Lu223
If this is so, the statute thus expressly provides that because
kumi.
land-use regulation that differentiates between religious and secular
assemblies or institutions is either not neutral or not generally appli224
cable, the maximum permissible constitutional protection for a violation of the Equal Terms provision is strict scrutiny of the challenged regulation. The Court’s decisions in Smith and Lukumi limited
the availability of searching judicial review for religious plaintiffs; they
did not expand constitutional protection for religious liberty to en225
Further, Lukumi mandates that the strict
compass strict liability.
scrutiny applied to a regulation be rigorous, and perhaps “fatal in
fact,” assuaging fears that courts will be less than rigorous in reviewing

221
222
223

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2006).
146 CONG. REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).
Cf. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir.

2004).
224

See id. at 1235 (“[A] violation of § (b)’s equal treatment provision indicates that
the offending law also violates the Smith rule . . . .”). But see Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A regulation
does not automatically cease being neutral and generally applicable, however, simply
because it allows certain secular behaviors but not certain religious behaviors.”).
225
Campbell admits that “a textual interpretation of the equal terms provision might
prohibit some government regulations that would be constitutional if analyzed under
free exercise or equal protection jurisprudence.” Campbell, supra note 14, at 1098.
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laws that burden religious exercise. As a result, and despite the fact
that Congress may have made the “implicit judgment that no permissible reason justifies treating religious assemblies and institutions less
227
favorably than secular assemblies and institutions,” the Midrash
court’s approach to the Equal Terms provision is the most sound.
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit’s test construes RLUIPA so as to render it practically ineffective. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to name a
secular assembly or institution that could have the same effect on the
regulatory purpose of a land-use law as a religious assembly or institution, particularly where other, unrelated laws treat religious groups
differently. It is true that if a religious plaintiff could clear this high
hurdle, the government would not have a chance to demonstrate a
compelling interest under Lighthouse. The first prong of the Third Circuit’s test, however, functions to limit the number of plaintiffs who can
state a claim of unequal treatment such that courts will not reach the
second prong in many, if not most, cases. As a result, future courts considering this issue should adopt Midrash’s textually sensitive approach.
When a court interprets a statute and its decision becomes final,
the court removes that issue from the political process. If the American people believe that RLUIPA unjustly favors religious entities over
secular ones, the political process is perfectly capable of facilitating
the election of representatives who will amend the statute or repeal it
altogether. Hopefully, in time, the Supreme Court will step in to restore to the American people the democratic rights and religious
freedom that they were promised by the Constitution and RLUIPA.

226

See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993) (“The compelling interest standard that we apply once a law fails to meet the
Smith requirements is not ‘water[ed] . . . down’ but ‘really means what it says.’” (citation omitted)); see also Campbell, supra note 14, at 1103 (“[T]here is a risk that courts
will apply a less-than-rigorous form of strict scrutiny in these religious land-use cases,
consequently weakening the protections intended by Congress.”).
227
Campbell, supra note 14, at 1104.

